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JOSEPH S. LARISA, JR. *
Hardly anyone has bothered to refer to the original understanding
of the framers of the Constitution. This is a significant oversight,
because . . fhJoth the text of the Appointments Clause of the
Constitution and the debates over its adoption strongly suggest
that the Senate was expected to play an active and independent
role in determining who should sit on the nation's judiciary.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Senate rejection of judge Robert H. Bork represented the
first time in the history of the United States that. the Senate openly
rejected a nominee exclusively because of disagreement with his
view of constitutional interpretation. 2 Consequently, the issue of
tCopyright ©1980 Joseph S. Larisa, Ir.
* Law Clerk 10 the Flonorable J. Daniel Mahoney, United Slates Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, J,D, 1988 & A.B. 1085 Duke University. I wish to thank Professor Thomas
D. Rowe for his insightful suggestions on an earlier draft of this article.
' Dellinger, Choosing judges, The Framer's Intent, 132 Copt:. REC. SI2,380 (daily ed. Sept.
i i, 1986) (statement of Sen. Biden).
2 Several rejections in the past have been ideologically based, but never has the ideological
opposition been both open wit! exclusive. See Dellinger, The Coming Battle for the sapreine
Court, THE NEw RI-Atomic, Dec. 16, 1985, at 40 ("When voting to reject a nominee, senators
have thought it necessary publicly to rationalize their vote on the grounds of lack of ethics
or competence, rather Ihan nu the more hottest basis of objections to the nominee's philos-
ophy."). Of the live other Si/pi -mit! Court rejections in this cenotry, one, that of G. Harrold
Carswell, was attributable mainly to lack of qualifications. See McClmnell, Haynsworth and
Carswell: A New Senate Standard of'Excellenee, 59 Kr. L.J. 8, 23 (1070). Another, that of Douglas
Ginsburg, resulted from an et hical impropriety. The other three (,john j. Parker, Abe Fortas
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whether the Senate should consider a nominee's judicial philosophy
or ideology3
 in its "Advice and Consent"' role came into sharp focus.
Senators and legal commentators debated the issue on two fronts.
The first concerned to what extent the Constitution and the framers'
intent required or supported ideological review. The second con-
cerned the prudence of the Senate assuming such a role.
Several commentators who believe that it is appropriate for the
Senate to oppose nominees on ideological grounds argue that a
proper reading of the framers' intent and/or fair inference from
the Constitution's text lend strong support to their position. 5 They
and Clement Haynsworth) were largely based upon opposition to the nominee's judicial
philosophy. See Friedman, The Transformation in Senate Response to Supreme Court Nominations:
From Reconstruction to the Taft Administration and Beyond, 5 CAttnozo L. Rev. 1, 80-82 (1083).
In each of these, however, the ideological opposition was not exclusive and was clothed in
more neutral terms, See, e.g., Grossman & Wasby, The Senate and Supreme Court Nominations:
Some Reflections, 1072 L.J. 557, 577 (conflict of interest issue at Haynsworth hearings
"provided a convenient justification for opposition generated in fact by ideological or political
considerations").
3
 "Judicial philosophy" or "ideology" will refer to a nominee's view of constitutional
interpretation and how this view would affect the outcome or cases. As an initial matter, no
one disagrees with the proposition that the Senate is properly exercising its advice and
consent role when it rejects a nominee who does not possess the requisite ability, integrity
and judicial temperament. It also is generally agreed t hat the Senate should reject a nominee
who does not adhere to certain "broad principles that are 'crucial to our sense of what
America is all about. — Friedman, Tribal Myths: Ideology and the Corgirmation of Supreme Court
Nominations, 95 YALE L.J. 1288 (1986) (reviewing and quoting L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS
HONORABLE, COURT (1985)). Because a President would rarely, if ever, name a nominee of
this type, the battle revokes around whether the Senate should reject nominees who hold
views of constitutional interpretation that reasonable people espouse.
The Constitution states that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court." U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
' See, e.g., Black, A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 VALE L.J.
657, 660 (1970) ("The Constitution certainly permits, if it clues not compel, „ . the conclusion
that a Senator both !nay and ought to consider the lifeview and philosophy of a nominee
. . ."); Dellinger, Choosing Judges, The Framers' Intent, 132 Conn. REc. at S12,380-81 (daily
ed. Sept. I I, 1986) (notion that Senate should not consider judicial philosophy is "simply
inconsistent with both the text and original intent of the appointments clause"); Dellinger,
The Coming Rattle for the Supreme Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 16, 1985, at 41 (debates
over appointments clause lend "significant support" to notion that "Senators should make
their own independent judgment . . . over whether to confirm a nominee"): Lively. The
Supreme Court Appointment Process: In Search of Constitutional Roles and Responsibilities, 59 S.
CAL. L. REV. 551, 565 (1987) ("Wdeologically based opposition" is Iclonsistent with consti-
tutional tradition and commands concerning the Senate's proper role ... ."); Schwartz, The
Senate Can Play no, A.B.A. J. Aug. 1985, at 36, 38 ("A senator has a constitutional duty to
exercise independent judgment. over whether a n ominee will further or impede what he or
she] believes are appropriate goals and ideals for the nation.").
The debate has been characterized by language unhelpful in determining what standard
the Senate constitutionally should Use. For instance, Professor Dellinger has stated that the
July 1989]
	
IDEOLOGICAL REVIEW	 971
conclude that the Constitution should be read as strongly support-
ing the idea of ideological review, or more forcefully, that a consti-
tutional duty exists for senators to reject a nominee under certain
circumstances."
framers meant for the Senate to take a much more "active" role than it has in recent years,
and that this "may conic as a surprise to the administration officials who are so concerned
about original intent," Kitchen Cabinet, LEGAL Tms, July 21, 1986, at 3. Because the com-
mentators who use language such as "active," "broad," "equal," and "independent" are
uniformly in favor of ideological review, these words should be understood as arguing that
the Constitution by inference and/or the framers' intent supports Senate rejections on ideo-
logical grounds.
6 Senator Biden, the present Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, argued the
stronger position during the Bork hearings. The senator asserted that the "Framers intended
. . . the broadest rule for the Senate — in choosing the Court and checking the President in
every way" and that "the Senate has performed a constitutional function in attempting to
resist the President's ellOrts to remake the Court in his own image." 133 CONG. REC. 510,523
(daily ed. July 23, 1987). The Senate has exercised this constitutional function by "scruti-
niz[ing] the political, legal, and constitutional views of nominees" and "reject[ing] profession-
ally qualified nominees because of the perceived effect of their views on the Court and the
country." Id, Senator Biden concluded that there arc three circumstances in which the Senate
has a "constitutional duty" to reject nominees on grounds of judicial philosophy: "[w]hen the
President attempts to use the Court for political purposes; when the President and Congress
are deeply divided; or when the Court is divided and a single nomination can bend it in the
direction of the President's political purposes." id, at S10,527-58
Whatever the merit or demerit of these standards as a prudential matter, fur the reasons
stated herein they arc in no way required by the Constitution or implied by the debates over
the appointments clause.
Not surprisingly, senators who believe it is proper to oppose nominees on ideological
grounds are almost exclusively those opposing the judicial philosophy of the current nominee.
When a nominee with a more compatible judicial philosophy is up for confirmation, however,
consideration 01 ideology becomes taboo. For example, Senator Kennedy vehemently op-
posed the confirmation of Judge Bork on ideological grounds, see 133 CONG. REC. S9188
(daily ed. July 1, 1987), whereas Senator Thurmond thought judicial philosophy to he
subordinate to neutral concerns such as integrity, judicial temperament and understanding
of the law. See Hearings Before the Committer on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on the Nomination
of Robert H. Bork to be Associate justice, (Comm. Print) 100th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. I, at 40 (1987).
Yet compare these past statements:
I believe it is recognized by most Senators that we are not charged with the
responsibility of approving a man to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
only if his views coincide with our own. We are not seeking a nominee for the
Supreme Court who will express the majority view of the Senate on every given
issue, or on a given issue of fundamental importance. We are interested really
in knowing whether the nominee has the background, experience, qualifications,
temperament, and integrity to handle this most sensitive, important, responsible
job.
133 CONG. REC. S 10,883 (daily ed. July 30, 1987) (statement of Senator Hatch, quoting
Senator Kennedy at Marshall hearings).
It is my contention . 	 that the Supreme Court has assumed such a powerful
role as a policymaker in the Government that the Senate must necessarily be
concerned with the views of prospective Justices or Chief Justices as they relate
to broad issues confronting the American people, and the role of the Court in
dealing with these issues.
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Critical examination of these arguments has been inadequate.'
If left unchallenged, the notion could become accepted dogma at
future confirmation hearings, with the danger that the Constitution
would be seen as supporting Senate rejections of nominees who
hold views of constitutional interpretation that reasonable people
espouse — even if prudential considerations suggest that the Senate
should confirm the nominee. The purpose of this essay is to dem-
onstrate that the idea that textual inference or framers' intent sup-
ports the position of ideological review is popular mythology, as is
the notion that a Senate that does not consider judicial philosophy
is behaving "inconsistent[ly] with both the text and the original
intent of the Appointments Clause." 8 The Constitution itself lends
little support for this idea, and the Framers' intent is at best inde-
terminate."
This essay presents the arguments of ideological-review advo-
cates concerning the framers' intent and constitutional implication.
It then critiques the reasoning of these commentators. Finally, it
133 CoNG. Rec. S10,526 (daily ed. July 23, 1987) (statement of Senator Biden, quoting
Senator Thurmond at Fortas hearings).
Senator Hatch has been the lone voice in opposition. In his review of Professor Tribe's
book, the senator attacked the notion that constitutional inference supports ideological review,
see Hatch, Save the Court From What?, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1347, 1353-56 (1986) (reviewing
L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE TUB HONORABLE Couicr (1985)). In a speech responding to Senator
Biden, Senator 1-latch also attacked the idea that the framers intended ideological review
and disputed the notion of a "constitutional duty" to reject a nominee. See 133 CONG. REC.
S10,878-85 (daily ed. July 30, 1987). In further maintaining that constitutional inference
and intent suggest tli;ti senators should not engage in ideological review, see id. at S10,881;
however, Senator Hatch's position is more problematic, see also infra note 9.
See Dellinger, Choosing Judges, The Framers' Intent, 132 CONG. Rec.. 512.381 (daily ed.
Sept. 11, 1986).
To the extent the framers' intent tells' us anything on this issue, it works against the
position of ideological-review advocates. See infra section 111. Nonetheless, this essay does not
claim that the constitutional intent mandates that ideological review not be practiced. Cf.
Monaghan, The Confirmation Process.- Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. Rev. 1202, 1202, 1205
(1988) ("Constitution is silent on what criteria the Senate should use in giving 'Advice and
Consent— and there is "no constitutional duty on senators to vote for confirmation" even
where nominee has "surpassing qualifications").
In defending his nomination of G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme Court, President
Nixon stated that the President is "the one person entrusted by the Constitution with the
power of appointment" and that the question before the Senate was "whether this respon-
sibility can be frustrated by those who wish to substitute their own philosphy or their own
subjective judgment for that of the one person entrusted by the Constitution with the power
of appoinunent." See 116 CONG. REC. 10,158 (1970) (letter of President Nixon to Senator
Saxbe). To the extent this letter implies that the Senate has a constitutional duty not to
consider a nominee's judicial philosophy, it is as erroneous as Senator Biden's opinion that
the Senate has a constitutional duty to consider judicial philosophy. See supra note G.
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concludes that the Constitution does not settle the matter; therefore,
the issue of whether the Senate should engage in ideological review
of Supreme Court nominees should be fought on prudential
grounds.
II. THE CASE FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL INTENT
The notion of a constitutional intent for ideological review of
Supreme Court nominees derives from four areas: first, the Con-
stitutional Convention in the summer of 1787; second, Alexander
Hamilton and The Federalist; third, the Senate rejection of John
Rutledge as Chief justice in 1795; and finally, direct inference from
the text of article II.
Proponents of ideological review maintain that throughout
their deliberations over the appointments clause the framers ex-
pected the Senate to "play a very substantial role in the selection of
federal judges"' and that the clause, as finally adopted, did not
change this intention." The leading advocate of this position, Pro-
fessor Walter Dellinger, recounts the progression of the appoint-
ments clause at the Constitutional Convention held in Philadelphia
in the summer of 1787.' 2
The original plan for the Constitution provided that "a Na-
tional Judiciary be established . . . to be chosen by the National
Legislature." When the proposal was presented to the Convention,
it was thought that the entire legislature was too large. Nonetheless,
1 " Dellinger, Choosing Judges, The Framers. ' Intent, 130 CoNG. REc. S12,380 (daily ed. Sept.
11, 1986); see also 133 Cote. REC. S I 0,523 (daily ed. July 23, 1987) (statement. of Sen. Bitten).
I' See sources cited supra note 10; see also Rees, Questions fin . Supreme Court Nominees at
Confirmation Hearings.: Excluding the Constitution, 17 GA. L. Rev. 913, 937-38 (1983) ("[Elarly
drafts of article II provided for appintment by the Senate alone, and nothing in the records
of the Federal Constitutional Convention suggests that the change into the nomination by
the President and confirmation by the Senate was intended to produce a change in the factors
that the Senate should consider.").
Professor, now judge, Rees is an exception to the general rule that Iffose opposed to the
judicial philosophy of a given nominee and/or administration laud ideological review, whereas
those in favor condemn it. Rees was one of those in charge of choosing judges for the Reagan
administration before he was named Chief' fudge of American Samoa. In this lengthy article
he presents his case for ideological review. Generally, Rees feels that Senate consideration of
judicial philosophy offsets the President's consideration of the same.
' 2 The l'ollowing is an account of the history of the appointments clause. See Dellinger,
Choosing Judge', The Framers' latent, 132 CONG. REC. Si 2,380 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 198(i) and
133 Com:. Rix. 510,523 (daily ed. July 23, 3987) (statement of Sen. Bitten). The source for
the depiction is J. MADISON, Notes or DEBATES IN THE FLDERAI, CONVENTION sue 1787 (1966)
[hereinafter Noms or DEBATES]. As explained below, however, there is more to the story.
See infra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
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Pennsylvania delegate James Wilson's alternative suggestion that the
President be given the power found almost no support. James Mad-
ison agreed that the legislature was too large a body, but said that
he was not prepared to give the appointment to the Executive;
rather, he was "inclined to give it to the Senatorial branch," which
he considered "sufficiently stable and independent" to provide "de-
liberate judgments."
On June 13, 1787, Madison moved that the power of appoint-
ing judges be given exclusively to the Senate, and the motion was
adopted without objection. On June 19, the Convention incorpo-
rated Madison's "Virginia Plan" in its working draft. The plan
proposed that a "national Judiciary" be created, the "Judges of
which to be appointed by the second Branch of the National Leg-
islature."
In July, the Convention reviewed every provision of the draft.
On the 18th of that month, James Wilson again moved "that the
judges be appointed by the Executive." The motion lost six states
to two. James Bedford of Delaware saw "solid reasons against leav-
ing the appointment to the Executive." Maryland's Luther Martin
argued that, "being taken from all the states," the Senate "would
be the best informed and most capable of making a fit choice."
Massachusetts delegate Nathaniel Ghorum offered a compromise
proposal that provided for appointment by the Executive "by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate." The proposal failed on
a tie vote — four states to four.
On July 21, the Convention again rejected Executive appoint-
ment and affirmed exclusive Senate appointment on a vote of six
states to three. George Mason of Virginia decried the notion of
Executive appointment as "dangerous precedent. It might even give
him influence over the Judiciary department itself." The Committee
on Detail reported the draft of the Constitution as "The Senate of
the U.S. shall have the power to ... appoint . . Judges of the
Supreme Court." And the phrasing remained the same until the
final clays of the Convention.
The controversy would not die, however, and on September 4,
the Committee on Postponed Matters reported back with a draft
reading that "[t]he President shall nominate and by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint judges of the Su-
preme Court." Three clays later the Convention adopted the pro-
vision without dissent. This was the first time the Convention had
given the President any role at all in the selection of judges.
July 19891	 IDEOLOGICAL REVIEW	 975
From this account Professor Dellinger and Senator Biclen find
a mandate for ideological review of Supreme Court nominees. Pro-
fessor Dellinger concludes that "[t]he Convention having repeatedly
and decisively rejected the idea that the President should have the
exclusive power to select judges could not possibly have intended
to reduce the Senate to a ministerial role," and indeed intended the
"selection of judges [to be] a joint decision of the President and the
Senate." 5 Senator Biden asserts that "it is difficult to imagine that,
after four _attempts to exclude the President from the selection
process, the Framers intended anything less than the broadest role
for the Senate — in choosing the Court and checking the President
in every way. "14
Alexander Hamilton's Federalist Nos. 76 and 77 have also been
cited as support for ideological review. Senator Biden relies on these
two Federalist papers in arguing that "[Alexander] Hamilton stressed
that even the Federalists intended an active and independent role
for the Senate."' 5 The senator points to Hamilton's statement in
Federalist No. 76 that the Senate would prevent the President from
appointing Justices who were "obsequious instruments of his plea-
sure." He refers also to Hamilton's statement in Federalist No. 77,
made in response to worries that the Senate's power to reject might
give it an improper influence over the Executive: "If by influencing
the President, be meant restraining him, this is precisely what must
have been intended. And it has been shown that the restraint would
be salutary.'"
Senator Biden interprets the debates over the adoption of the
appointments clause and the perspective of Alexander Hamilton as
settling "beyond dispute from an historical perspective" that the
framers intended Senate rejections on ideological grounds.°
The third basis for the argument that the framers intended the
Senate to engage in ideological review is the Senate's rejection, in
1795, of former Justice Rutledge of South Carolina. Two commen-
tators have suggested that ideologiCal review is warranted because
" many of the framers of the Constitution, as Senators, conducted
15 Dellinger, Choosing Judges, The Framers' Intent, 132 CONG. Rec. S 12,380-8 1 (daily ed.
Sept. 11, 1986).
14 133 CONG. REG. 510,523 (daily ed. July '23, 1987) (statement of Sen. iliden).
15 Id.
I" Id.
' 7 Id.
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precisely such an inquiry" in refusing to confirm John Rudedge. 18
Rutledge was nominated for the position of Chief Justice by Presi-
dent Washington on July 1, 1795. He was one of Washington's first
appointments, but subsequently resigned to become Chief Justice
in his home state of South Carolina. Prior to Senate consideration
of his nomination, it was disclosed that Rutledge had given a speech
shortly before his appointment violently attacking the recently ra-
tified and highly controversial Jay treaty with England. Support for
the treaty was of utmost importance for the Federalists, who viewed
Rutledge's public opposition with astonishment. Consequently, the
Federalist-dominated Senate rejected the nomination, in large part
because of Rutledge's public opposition to the treaty."
Professor Lively sees the Rutledge rejection as evidence that
the framers would not agree that "Senate attempts to substitute its
judgment" in the confirmation process would upset "traditional
constitutional balances."'" This position, according to Professor
Lively, "disregards the fact that the framers of the Constitution
themselves participated, as Senators, in policy-based battles with the
president over Supreme Court appointinents."21
Finally, commentators have inferred a mandate for ideological
review from the language in article 11 of the Constitution, which
provides that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the
supreme Court .. ." 22 It is argued that this language gives the
Senate and the President equivalent roles in the confirmation pro-
cess. The more similar the roles, the greater the likelihood that the
Senate was intended to consider the same factors as the President,
i.e., the ideology of the nominee, and in the same manner.
Thus Professor Dellinger and Senator Biden point out that at
the Constitutional Convention, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania
paraphrased the provision as giving the Senate the power "to ap-
point Judges nominated to them by the President." 23 Professor Del-
linger paraphrased the provision as "giving the President the power,
' 8 Lively, supra note 5, at 552-53 (citing McKay, Selection of United Stales Supreme Court
Justices, 9 U. KAN. L. REV. 105, 129 (1960)).
1 " See 1 C. WARREN, TILE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 124-39 (1022).
8" Lively, supra note 5, at 557 n.36.
2 ' Id.; see also id. at 552-53.
22 U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, el, 2.
23 Dellinger, Choosing Judges, The Framers' Intent, 130 CoNG. REC. S 12,380 (daily ed. Sept.
11, 1086); 133 GONG. REc. S10,523 (daily ed. July 23, 1087) (statement of Sen. Biden).
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with the advice of the Senate, to nominate judges, and the power,
with the consent of the Senate, to appoint." 24
Moreover, in discussing constitutional intent, ideological-review
advocates speak of nomination as "a joint decision of the President
and the Senate,"" where the Senate has "equal responsibility" and
a "half interest in the appointment process." 26 The selection of
nominees was intended to be a. "joint enterprise,"27 in which the
Senate was to have the "broadest role" in "choosing the Court and
checking the President in every way." 28 Representative of' this think-
ing is the notion that "[a] Senate role that is equal, rather than
subordinate, to the president's is consistent with the compromise,
effected by James Madison, between drafters who favored exclusive
selection by the executive and those who preferred exclusive power
in the Senate."" In the least, these commentators maintain that
"[t]he Constitution certainly permits, if it. does not compel, . . . the
conclusion that a Senator both may and ought to consider . . . the
life view and philosophy of a nominee . . . ." 30
Ill. EXPOSING THE M vrti
The notion that a constitutional intent for ideological review
exists is popular mythology. Support claimed to exist in the debates
at the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the views of Alexander
Hamilton as expressed in Federalist Nos. 76 and 77, the Senate
rejection of John Rutledge as Chief Justice, and fair inference From
article II of the Constitution does not: survive careful scrutiny.
The debates at the Constitutional Convention do not show that
the Senate was intended to have a "broad" role, including ideolog-
ical review. Aside from the problem that the framers did not pass
on the question of ideological review,'" there exists the difficulty in
translating evidence for a "broad" Senate role into a constitutional
'4 Dellinger, Choosing judges, Tilw Framers' Intenl, 132 CONG. REG, S12,380, 381 (daily ed.
Sept. I I, 1980).
2 Id.
'" Lively, Su/PV note 5, at 563.
27 Id. at 573.
2' 133 CoNn. REc. SI 0,523 (daily ed. July 23, 1987) (statement of Sen. Bidet).
2t' Lively, supra note 5, at 554 11.24.
'" Black, supra note 5, at 660.
" The framers did not consider whether a senator should reject a nominee. who he or
she feels is bad for the country but. nonetheless holds views of constitutional interpretation
that reasonable people espouse.
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mandate for ideological review. 32 Moreover, the finally adopted ap-
pointments clause was seen as counseling against a broad role for
the Senate.
Although the history of the constitutional debates presented by
ideological-review advocates is accurate, it is incomplete. The history
gives only one side of the debate — the losing side. The account
also fails to consider what the framers were attempting to accom-
plish with the appointments clause.
Early in the Convention, James Madison supported Senate ap-
pointment over appointment by the entire legislature. He was look-
ing for a selection procedure that would ensure competent "judges
of the requisite qualifications." 33 Madison was also concerned with
the "danger of intrigue and partiality" that would accompany selec-
tion "by the Legislature or any numerous body." 54 Although the
delegates originally saw problems with Executive appointment, no-
where did the framers consider the effect of the policy views of
judges; rather, they were concerned with who would be able to
choose the best qualified judges, without becoming embroiled in
"intrigue and partiality."35
In the summer of 1787 the Convention considered six different
methods of appointment before finally settling on one. 36 The del-
egates, including James Madison, would move from appointment
by the Senate alone to the finally adopted presidential appointment
with Senate concurrence." Selective quoting from one side of the
debate obscures the fact that the Convention as a whole was very
much undecided on the proper method of appointment until its
unanimous decision in September to place it in the hands of the
3' Similar difficulty arises in translating evidence for a "narrow" Senate role into a
constitutional mandate against ideological review. See supra note 9.
3' NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 12, at 68.
34 Id .
"- See infra notes 40-43, 46-52, 57-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Hamilton and Ghorum.
'" The Convention also considered having the legislature nominate, the Senate nominate,
the President nominate, the President nominate with the concurrence of one-third of the
Senate, and the Senate nominate subject to the approval of the President. See NOTES oF
DEBAms, .supra note 12, at 345 (remarks of 0. Ellsworth).
37 Strangely, the conversion or James Madison is omitted from the history of both
Professor Dellinger and Senator Biden. in fact, Madison would have gone further than the
rest of the Convention in proposing Executive appointment subject to the concurrence of
only one-third of the Senate. See NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 12, at 316, 343 (remarks of J.
Madison). Madison. however, was suite happy with the final result. See id. at 346 (remarks
of J. Madison approving of one-half Senate concurrence); cf. id. at 112-13 (remarks of J.
Madison proposing appointment by the Senate).
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President. This meaningful deliberation resulted in the final draft,
giving the President the power to nominate."
All of this concerns the early intent of the framers. Yet the full
intentions of the framers can be ascertained only by looking at the
clause finally adopted, and contrasting it with what was rejected.
The consensus the Convention arrived at was complete: The dele-
gates rejected all other formulations and adopted the current lan-
guage of the appointments clause, as rewritten by the Special Com-
mittee on Postponed Matters, without one dissent. The most
significant fact is not that some earlier proposals would have ex-
cluded the President from the appointment process, but that those
proposals were rejected: The delegates •consciously gave the Presi-
dent, and not the Senate, the power to nominate judges. 39 As finally
proposed to and ratified by the states, the Constitution granted to
the President the principal role of selecting and proposing candi-
dates, and the Senate the more restricted role of approving or
disapproving the nominations.
At the Convention, Alexander Hamilton was the first delegate
to propose that the President's nomination be submitted to the
Senate for approval by a simple majority.° Therefore, his views of
advice and consent assume particular significance. In both The Fed-
eralist and the Rutledge rejection, Hamilton unequivocally shunned
a broad Senate role.'"
Delegate Ghorum's views are also particularly instructive. He
was the father of the "advice and consent" clause, borrowing the
wording from the Constitution of his home state of Massachusetts.
Ghorum worried that the Senate would be "too numerous, and too
little personally responsible, to ensure a good choice." 42 And the
55 The appointments clause was not simply a last minute compromise, as Senator Bidet]
has suggested. See Biden, 133 CoNG. Rm. 510,523 (daily ed. July 23, 1987) (article II was an
"11th hour compromise"). The clause was nearly passed on July 18, a full six weeks before
the end of the Convention, failing on a four-states-to-four tie vote. Noms OF DEBATES, supra
note 12, at 317.
U.S, CossT. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2. One might also note that the framers could not have
intended to give the Senate the "broadest role" in the process: If they had desired to do so,
they would have left the appointment power exclusively with the Senate.
" See No'rEs OF DEBATES, supra note 12, at 138; J. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT
OF THE SENATE 21 (1953).
41 See infra notes 46-52, 57-58 and accompanying text,
12 NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 12, at 314. Expanding on his belief that the President
is best situated to choose Justices, Ghorum also argued that "the Executive ... will be careful
to look through all of the States for proper characters . ." He referred to one state as a
"full illustration of the insensibility to character, produced by a participation of numbers, in
dishonorable measures, and of the length to which a public body may carry wickedness &
cabal," Id. at 315.
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concurrence of the Senate, James Madison argued, would guard
against "any incautious or corrupt nomination by the Executive."
Moreover, the President would "equally sympathi[ze] with every
part of the United] States," whereas if the Senate chose judges they
might be chosen "by a minority of the people.'"
Those framers who foresaw the development of political parties
in America believed that the constitutional role given to the Senate
would prevent partisan rejections.'" Others hoped, but were not so
optimistic. John Adams "vigorously criticiz[ed] the appointment
provisions of the Constitution and predict[ed] that political parties
would quickly arise and that partisan considerations would domi-
nate the actions of the Senate in passing upon nominations of the
President."45 In sum, fairly evaluated, the debates over the adoption
of article II steadfastly refute the notion that a broad Senate role,
including ideological review was necessarily the framers' design.
Senator Biden has attempted to employ one delegate's views —
Alexander Hamilton and The Federalist — for support. Senator Bi-
den quotes from Federalist No. 77, which advocates a "restraining"
role for the Senate. Unfortunately, the Senator ignores language in
the preceding Federalist No. 76, which explains how, and the pur-
pose for which, the restraint would be exercised:
To what purpose then require the co-operation of the
Senate? I answer, that the necessity of their concurrence
would have a powerful though ... excellent check upon
the spirit of favouritism in the President, and would tend
greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters
from State prejudice, from family connection, from per-
sonal attachment, or from a view to popularity. 4t'
This passage lends no support for a broad Senate role, and it
certainly does not seem to support Senator Biden's position. 47 Ham-
" Noms or DEBATES, SUPTa note 12 at 316, 344.
44 See I Halms, supra note 40, at 20 (Those who feared the political machinations of
legislative bodies believed they had won with the final draft of the appointments clause.).
45 Id. at 29.
" THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 513 (A. Hamilton) (,J. Cooke ed. 1961).
47 Compare Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Rote, 102 HARV. L. REV. 672, 672
(1989) (Legitimate bases for Senate rejection under "Hamiltonian model" exist only where
the nominee (1) has pledged to vote a "certain way on specific issues"; (2) was selected because
of "cronyism or financial association" with the President or his party; or (3) was chosen "solely
to appease a narrow partisan constituency.") and Monaghan, supra note 9 at 1205 (THE
FEDERALIST envisioned narrow Senate role) with supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text
(interpreting THE FEDERALIST Nos. 76 and 77 as conceiving or broad Senate role).
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ikon further explained that the Senate would be rather circumspect
in rejecting the President's nominees:
But might not [the President's] nomination be overruled?
1 grant it might, yet this could only be to ,make place for
another nomination by himself. • . . The Senate could not
be tempted, by the preference they might feel to another,
to reject the one proposed; because they could not assure
themselves that the person they might wish would be [sub-
sequently nominated]. . . Lilt is not likely that their sanc-
tion would often be refused where there were not special
and strong reasons for the refusal.'"
Senator Biden also notes that Hamilton thought. Senate review
would prevent confirmation of Executive appointments who were
"obsequious instruments of his pleasure."'" Yet it is clear that Ham-
ilton's concern was not with the congruence of the nominee's judicial
philosophy with the President's, but rather with the nominee's com-
petence and integrity. Hamilton explained that, because of the re-
quirement of advice and consent, the President "would be both
ashamed and afraid to bring forward ... candidates who had no
other merit than that of ... possessing the necessary insignificance
and pliancy to render them the obsequious instruments of his 1)let-
sure." 5° Consequently, a fair reading of The Federalist does not aid
the case for constitutional intent.
18 THE - FEDERALIST No. 76, at 512 (A. Hamilton) (3. Cooke ed. 1961). Professor Black
rhetorically asks whether a "special and strong" reason for a negative vote would exist when
a "nominee holds skewed and purblind views of social justice." Black, supra note 5, at 662.
One might first question whether such a nominee, so far out of the mainstream, has been
. or ever will be nominated. Assuming the answer is yes, and that the nominee's views are
truly radical, e.g., a belief' that "separate but equal" should again be the law of the land, there
may exist a prudential bar to confirmation. But so long as it Senator is convinced that the
nominee is serious about upholding the Constitution, there might not be a constitutional bar
to confirmation. ln any case, one can grant that this situation would present a "special and
strong" reason for rejection. This would still support Hamilton's point that rarely would this
reason ever be present, and thus rejection warranted.
Yet Professor Black is in all probability not talking about such an unlikely case; rather,
he most likely had in mind disagreement in areas of constitutional interpretation where
reasonable people disagree — i.e., whether the fourteenth amendment forbids race conscious
hiring practices. Does TnE rEnExmls -r suggest a constitutional intent that a senator reject
nominees with whom he or she disagrees on these kind of issues? Hamilton's answer, in all
likelihood, would be "no." As explained infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text, Hamilton
strongly opposed the first rejection of a Supreme Court nominee on policy grounds — even
though he disagreed with the nominee.
41 THE EmuutAffsT No. 76, at 513 (A. FiarnilloD) (J. Cooke ed. 196 1.).
," Id. George Mason's concern that Executive appointment might give the President
"influence" over the judiciary was also over the competence and integrity of the nominee,
not judicial philosophy.
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The Senate rejection of John Rutledge as Chief justice in 1795
is also wholly unpersuasive as support for ideological review of
Supreme Court nominations. It is true that many senators did op-
pose Rutledge's confirmation as Chief Justice in 1795 because of
his earlier opposition to the Jay Treaty. 5 ' Yet it is also true that
many were equally concerned over the nominee's allegedly deteri-
orating mental competence. 52
Professor Lively asserts that "many of the framers, as Senators"
opposed Rutledge." Nowhere, however, is it stated how many of the
fifty-five delegates to the Constitutional Convention engaged in the
ideological opposition to Justice Rutledge. In fact, though Rutledge
lost by a 14-10 vote, 54
 only six of the senators who voted attended
the Constitutional Convention, 55 and only three of these six voted
against Rutledge.5" -
Moreover, Alexander Hamilton, a leading member of the Fed-
eralist Party, which strongly supported the Jay Treaty, advised sen-
ators to reject Rutledge only if they felt he was mentally incompetent,
and not simply because of his speech against the Jay Treaty. 57 Thus,
the originator of the appointments clause clearly opposed rejection
of Justice Rutledge on policy grounds. In light of these facts, it can
hardly be said that the Rutledge rejection supports the argument
that the framers intended the Senate to engage in ideological re-
view."
5 ' See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
52
 THE JUSTICES Of THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND
MAJOR OPINIONS 48 (L. Friedman & F. Israel ed. 1969) (arguing that insanity charge was
supported by "many contemporaneous references to specific incidents of derangement,"
including a suicide attempt after hearing of rejection by the Senate).
52 Lively, supra note 5, at 552-53.
54 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 'rliE SUPREME COURT OF '[HE UNITED STATES, 1789-
1800, at 99 (M. Marcus & J. Perry ed. 1985) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY His -rowel (listing
senators supporting and opposing Rutledge).
55 See C. 1001,VEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: Tim STORY OF 'EHE CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
VENTION, MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at xvii—xix (1986) (listing delegates who attended the
Convention). The six senators who attended the Convention and passed upon the Rutledge
confirmation were Pierce Butler (South Carolina), Alexander Martin (North Carolina), John
Langdon (New Hampshire), Oliver Ellsworth (Connecticut), Rufus King (Massachusetts sen-
ator, New York delegate) and Caleb Strong (Massachusetts). Id.; DOCUMENTARY HisTottr,
supra note 54, at 99.
56
 The three were Ellsworth, King and Strong. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 54,
at 99.
57 See 1 C. WARREN, 514pra note 19, at 136.
56 Perhaps a better argument, yet one riot made by Professor Lively, is that the Rutledge
rejection illustrmed the understanding of a Senate, only six years removed from the passage
of the Constitution, that ideologically-based rejections were appropriate. This argument,
however, would ignore the fact that much of the Rutledge opposition was motivated by fear
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Finally, ideological-review advocates make much of the lan-
guage of article II itself. Yet the debates at the Constitutional Con-
vention and the text of the Constitution they yielded make clear
that the Senate and the President were to have different roles in
the appointment process. Moreover, contrary to Senator Biden's
view,59 only the President was given the responsibility to choose nom-
inees. 69 In not giving the Senate the responsibility of choosing the
Supreme Court nominee, the framers did not wholly endorse Sen-
ate rejections of nominees whose judicial philosophy is held by
reasonable people. Yet, the more the Senate engages in ideological
review — and rejects nominees with a judicial philosophy similar to
the President's — the more it limits the President's choice. Even-
of mental instability, and that the framers themselves split three-to-three on the confirmation
vote. More importantly, a Senate rejection eight years after the Constitutional Convention
does not imply that the framers originally intended ideological rejection to occur, especially
because those framers who did envision the existence of' political parties feared rather than
welcomed the thought of such rejections. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
5" See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Professor Dellinger is likewise incorrect in
his paraphrase of article II. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. The President alone
was given the power to nominate, See Rees, supra. note 11, at 937 ("[Ilf the text of article II,
section 2 implies anything about the scrutiny the Senate should apply, the implication would
seem to reside in the distinction between the president's unilateral power to 'nominate' and
his power to 'appoint' only with the approval of the Senate.").
6° Alexander Hamilton stated that:
There will, of course, be no exertion of choice on the part of the senate. They
may defeat one choice of the Executive, and oblige him to make another; but
they cannot themselves choose — they can only ratify or reject the choice he may
have made.
THE - FEDERALIST No. 66, at 449 (A. Hamilton) (j. Cooke ed. 1961); see aLso Friedman, supra
note 3, at 1287-88 n.24 (“[T]he Constitution gives the President a selective function, and
the Congress a reactive one, and the two are significantly different.").
One might object that this reasoning implies that the President constitutionally should
not exercise his veto power over congressional legislation on political grounds because only
Congress was given the power to make the law. The rejoinder would be that this article is
concerned only with making the more limited point that constitutional intent does not suggest
or imply that a senator consider each factor the President does, and not with the proposition
that a senator constitutionally should not consider each factor. The thesis of this article
therefore has little relevance on the question of whether the president constitutionally should
or should not consider politics in his or her veto decision.
Parenthetically, one might note that the two cases are fundamentally different. The
framers gave the Senate an even broader role in legislating than they gave the President in
nominating. When the President vetoes a piece of legislation, the Congress can, and often
does, override his or her veto and reenact the very same piece of legislation. On the other
hand, when the Senate "vetoes" the President's nominee, he or she has no such opportunity
to override the Senate. Other differences between considering legislation and Supreme Court.
nominees are also apparent. CI Friedman, supra note 2, at 88 n.560 (arguing that deadlock
over legislation between Senate and President may be preferable to hasty adoption of legis-
lation, but that it would he "difficult to make any corresponding argument in favor of a
deadlock that left the Supreme Court understaffed for an extended period").
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tually, by repeated rejections or a threat thereof, the Senate could
force the President to nominate a candidate more to its liking than
the President's — and thereby effectively "choose" a nominee. 6 '
Even Professor Tribe, one of the leading proponents of ideo-
logical review, acknowledges that the Constitution gives the Presi-
dent and the Senate different roles. It would not be acceptable for
the Senate to:
refus[e] to confirm a nominee to whom the Senators' only
objection is that the candidate would not have been their
first or even second choice. In Supreme Court appoint-
ments the Constitution allows only the President his
"druthers." Allowing each Senator to confirm only from
the Senator's own "short list" would prescribe paralysis in
the Supreme Court appointment process. 62
Despite the Convention's refusal to give the Senate the power
to choose the Supreme Court, several commentators speak of the
Senate's role as the same as the President's and consequently believe
that the Senate constitutionally should consider ideology as a factor
when the President does.° As already noted, these commentators
would agree that "[a] Senate role that is equal, rather than subor-
dinate, to the president's is consistent with the compromise, effected
by James Madison, between drafters who favored exclusive selection
by the executive and those who preferred exclusive power in the
Senate."64 There are several objections to this reasoning.
" 1
 It may be argued that all forms of review could have the consequence of turning into
"choice," This consequence is unlikely, however, &the review merely screens for more neutral
factors such as ability, integrity and judicial temperament, because a second nominee is likely
to be accepted if the first one is rejected. It is only when the review promotes a particular
Senate agenda that a President may be forced into effectively allowing the Senate to "choose."
" L TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE CouRT 107 (1985). In light of "Fribe's recognition
of a basic role differentiation, his later characterization of the Senate as "equal partner," id.
at 132, has little purpose, especially because Tribe accepts that "Mlle appointment process
requires the Senate only to react, not to create." Irl. at 131; see also Fried ti tan, supra note 3,
at 1287.
"3 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
" Lively, supra note 5. at 554 n.24. The notion of "equality" is an undefined one. "Equal
and not subordinate" might imply that the Senate constitutionally should consider ideology
in the same manner as the President. Yet this cannot be the case. As Professor Tribe recognizes,
the Constitution gives only the President the power to consider ideology in choosing nomi-
nees. The alternative notion of equality is that the Constitution implies I hat both the President
and the Senate should consider the same factors. Yet as discussed below, in other article 11
appointments, the President and Senate consider different factors. Thus, there is no consti-
rulional requirement that each consider the same factors. Of course, this does not preclude
— but rather necessitates — prudential arguments about whether each should consider the
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First, although Madison supported the compromise that even-
tually became the appointments clause, he did not believe that the
Senate's role should be "equal" to the President's. To the contrary,
Madison favored a confirmation process in which the President's
nomination needed only a one-third Senate concurrence and was
quite wary of Senate "intrigue and partiality" in the confirmation
process."5
Second, the appointments clause requires the President to
choose and the Senate to approve or reject the President's choice.
These two different constitutional responsibilities rebut the sugges-
tion that the appointments clause suggests no difference in the
factors the President and the Senate are each to consider. In fact,
the same appointments clause has allowed for broad Senate defer-
ence to the President's ideological choice in some areas — i.e.,
cabinet members. 66 One can also compare the Constitution's less
deferential advice and consent role concerning treaties — whose
same factors. Cf. Monaghan, ,s:upra note 9, t 1027 (entire appointment process is best
understood as ... involvfing1 mainly questions or prudence, judgment and politics).
65 See .sotpra notes 34, 37 and accompanying text.
66 The extent of such deference is exemplified by the fact that the Senate rejection of
John Tower for the cabinet position of Secretary of Defense was the lirst rejection of a
President's initial choice for a cabinet post in the history of the country. Of course, different.
considerations apply to the Senate's review of cabinet and Supreme Court nominations. The
cabinet consists of the "President's men" whereas the Supreme Court demands detachment
from the Executive. See Black, supra note 5, at 650-60.
An objection may be made that this view fails to consider the strong institution of
"senatorial courtesy" in the selection of lower court judges. Here, in essence, home state
senators choose the nominee; if the President tries to nominate other than the home stale
senator's choice, the senator can veto the choice and the nominee will be rejected. By
implication this supports a broad senate "advice and consent - role, including ideological
rev iew.
Yet the operation of senatorial courtesy has little bearing on the Senate's "advice and
consent" role concerning Stqwenie Court. nominees. First, in lower court appointments local
constituencies rather than a national one are being represented, with the opportunity or
individual senatm:s to play a much larger Nile. Second, the nominee is not the Senate's choice
in any real sense because the nominee must receive the President's imprimatur. Especially in
the Reagan administration, which carefully screened the judicial philosophy of potential
nominees, the President placed his mark on a nominee. Third, the framers certainly did not
envision senatorial courtesy. the Convention did not even establish lower courts but rather
simply gave Congress the power to "institute inferior tribunals," see Non: or DEBATEs,
note 12, at 72-73 (motion of J. Wilson & J. Madison), Thus, as a matter of constitutional
intent, senatorial courtesy in no way supports the notion that the framers intended a broad
Senate role, including ideological review.
These considerations aside, no one has suggested that senatorial courtesy be extended
to Supreme Court nominees. Flow would it work? The framers recognized the institutional
incapacity of the Senate to choose Supreme Court Justices. In any event, the institution of
senatorial courtesy actually supports the paint made in the text: Article I I allows different
levels of deference and does not define the standard for Supreme Court nominees.
986	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:969
passage requires two-thirds Senate concurrence. 67 Regardless of
what model of advice and consent one believes the Senate should
utilize in considering Supreme Court nominees, the Constitution
clearly allows for different levels of Senate deference to the Presi-
dent under article II. Therefore, to imply that the Constitution
suggests that the Senate should consider the same factors as the
President, including the ideology of the nominee, is unfounded. 68
The Constitution simply does not reflect the Senate's role as "equal
and not subordinate" in the sense that "equal" implies "same."
IV. CONCLUSION
The notion of a constitutional intent that a senator vote to
reject a Supreme Court nominee who holds a different view of
constitutional interpretation is popular mythology. In ascertaining
constitutional intent, what was not said is just as important as what
was said. Nothing in the debates at the Constitutional Convention
over the adoption of the appointments clause, in the text of The
Federalist, or in the Senate's later rejection of John Rutledge sup-
ports such a broad Senate role, including ideological review. Nor
does a fair reading of article II support ideological review by the
Senate.°
In light of this indeterminacy, a Senate that carries out its advice
and consent duty by largely deferring to the President's philosoph-
ical choice and ascertaining only whether a nominee is "qualified
by character and competence" is not acting "inconsistent[ly] with
both the text and the original intent of the Appointments Clause."'"
Because the Constitution does not settle the matter, the question
then becomes whether it is prudent for a senator to consider a
nominee's ideology in his vote. It is on this ground that the battle
over the proper "advice and consent" role for the Senate should be
fought.
67 U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Professor Dellinger has argued that the Senate's advice
and consent role should he the same for Supreme Court nominations as for treaties. Dellinger,
supra note 3, at 43. The text of the Constitution, however, does nut support the analogy:
The two-thirds concurrence required for ratification of treaties suggests that the framers
intended a greater Senate role, and consequently less deference, in consideration of treaties
than in the confirmation of Supreme Court nominees.
68 See Friedman, supra note 3, at 1287 n.24 (argument that Senate is "equal" is erroneous
to extent it implies that, under article II Senate must consider same factors as President).
Likewise, it cannot be said that original intent reveals a mandate against ideological
review. See Monaghan, supra note 9, at 1202, 1207.
7" See Dellinger, Choosing fudges, The Framers' Intent, 132 CONG. REC. 512,381 (daily ed.
Sept. 11, 1980).
